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Priority No. 2 
Case No. 950794-CA 
BASIS OF APPEAL AND JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from two third-degree felony convictions: discharging a 
firearm from a vehicle and causing a riot (R. 144-45). On appeal, defendant 
claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress evidence and 
failing to bring to the jury's attention evidence that one of the State's witnesses 
received a "benefit" for his testimony. Brief of Defendant at 14. This Court has 
jurisdiction over appeals from third-degree felony convictions under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(e) (Supp. 1995). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. When trial counsel refused to file a motion to suppress, did he 
provide substandard performance that prejudiced defendant? To successfully 
challenge trial counsel's ineffectiveness, defendant must establish both that his 
performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and, 
consequently, prejudiced the outcome of the trial. State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 
1239 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 
(1984)). 
2. Given defendant's failure to provide Jeremiah Graham's plea 
agreement and criminal record to the appellate court, is his claim that the trial 
would have ended in a more favorable result had those items been introduced, 
pure speculation? In Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993), the 
Utah Supreme Court ruled that "proof of ineffective assistance" must be a 
"demonstrable reality" not a speculative matter." 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
Any necessary provisions are included in the text. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History 
The State charged defendant with committing three crimes: (1) attempted 
murder, a second-degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 
(1995); (2) discharging a firearm from a vehicle, third-degree felony in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-508 (1995); and (3) causing a riot, a third-degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-9-101 (1995) (R. 6-8). 
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After a three-day trial, the jury acquitted defendant of the attempted 
murder charge but convicted him of the third-degree felony charges (R. 83-86). 
Subsequently, the trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent indeterminate 
prison terms of zero-to-five years and a consecutive indeterminate term of zero to 
five years as a firearm enhancement (R. 147). 
Statement of Facts 
THE DRIVE-BY SHOOTING 
At 9:45 in the evening on September 30, 1994, a purple Ford Ranger crept 
slowly up B Avenue in Ogden (R. 234). The three men in the cab and five in the 
truckbed, including defendant, wore sunglasses and "rags"1 around their heads 
to identify themselves as "Crips"2 and to disguise their personal identities (MJ. 
They were looking for the house where the "Bloods" were partying and they 
planned to raid it and fight their rivals (R. 234; 339). When they found the 
party, they told Emmett Johnson, the driver, to turn around at the top of the road, 
1
 "Rags" are bandanas (R. 237). 
2
 The term "Crips" refers to one of the two primary gang affiliations 
involved in this crime; the other being "Bloods" (R. 237). Defendant and the 
other individuals named in this Statement are Crips. The individuals in the truck 
were members of two "Crip" sub-gangs: O. V.G. ("One Violent Gangster") and 
Eight-Ball Crips (MJ Defendant belongs to the O.V.G. gang (R. 633). The 
victims were members of a "Bloods" gang called the West Side Players or West 
Side Pirus (R. 237). 
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drive down in front of the home and stop (R. 337). Orlando Naranjo, sitting in 
the truckbed, saw defendant pull his gun out of his coat and cock it (R. 337-38). 
One of the Crips in the back of the truck started yelling at the Bloods and 
throwing up their "signs," hand gestures that identify gang affiliation (id.). The 
bloods started running toward the truck, throwing rocks and beer cans when 
defendant, one of the Crips in the truck, pulled his gun and started shooting (R. 
235; 526). Emmett Johnson looked in his rear view mirror when he heard the 
shots and saw gun flashes coming from the defendant's location in the truckbed 
(R. 297). Of the eight fired bullets, all of which were 9 millimeter, three went 
through a baby's bedroom window in the apartment complex where the party 
occurred (R. 252). One passed through the leg of a baby chair (R. 252). 
Another hit Pedro Balli, a member of the "Bloods" gang, in the left thigh (R. 
280). 
Sitting in the back of the truck near defendant, Jeremiah Graham saw him 
put the gun back in his jacket after firing (R. 235). Afterward, Johnson 
"slammed on the gas" and another gang member told him to drive to the 
defendant's aunt's house in Roy (R. 298). During the drive, Jessie Diarte, 
another gang member in the truckbed, heard defendant say "I hope I got one" 
and saw him put the gun into his waistband (R. 463). When they arrived at the 
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house, defendant told Johnson to remove his neon purple license plate holder 
because "the police could identify the truck by that" (R. 301-02). He took the 
license plate holder into the house and left his gun under 16-year old Tiffany 
Almeida's bed (R. 365). After ten minutes, Johnson drove defendant back to the 
Fred Meyer in Ogden where he had earlier parked his car (R. 302). Diarte saw 
the license plate holder in the trunk of defendant's car (R. 466). 
THE SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S CAR 
Approximately two hours later, defendant was sitting in a Taco Maker 
restaurant in Ogden when West Side Pirus gang members drove into the parking 
lot (R. 612). Three of these "Bloods" came in and started gesturing at defendant 
and his friends, yelling "you shot my home boy" and telling them to come 
outside (R. 614). Defendant and one of his friends ran to the back of the kitchen 
and asked an employee to call the police (R. 526, 614). For the next 15 minutes, 
the Bloods waited out in a car and defendant and his friends stayed in the 
restaurant (R. 615). 
Two of the officers who responded, Officer Tony Huemiller and Officer 
Richard Stewart, both knew of the drive-by shooting earlier that evening and 
possible O.V.G./West Side Pirus involvement (R. 425, 430). Officer Stewart 
was called out as a result of that shooting (R. 416). They also knew that the 
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vehicle they were looking for had a neon license plate cover (R. 417, 431). 
When the officers arrived, they asked defendant to come outside where he gave 
them the keys to his car and allowed them to search (R. 617). Officer Stewart 
searched in the trunk and saw the neon license plate cover (R. 417). Officer 
Huemiller, searching the interior of the car, found the unspent bullet on the floor 
of the passenger side (R. 418-19, 428). Subsequent tests showed that the bullet 
had been chambered in the same weapon as the spent bullet casings found at the 
drive-by scene (R. 442). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant's claim of ineffective trial representation should be rejected 
because trial counsel properly refused to file a motion to suppress the bullet. 
Defendant's challenge to trial counsel's not impeaching Jeremiah Graham also 
fails because he does not provide evidence about the plea agreement or Graham's 
alleged criminal record. Therefore, defendant's assertion that the trial would 
have ended differently had this material been presented is speculation. 
The bullet was lawfully found under the plain view doctrine. Defendant 
does not contest that he consented to the search and that the bullet was in plain 
view. He challenges only the "clearly incriminating" nature of the bullet. When 
determining whether evidence is "clearly incriminating," courts look at the 
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circumstances and knowledge available to the officer. The officer knew of the 
two-hour old gang-related drive-by shooting, that defendant had in his trunk an 
incriminating piece of evidence, i.e., the license plate cover, wanted as part of 
that investigation. 
Though contesting trial counsel's not introducing into evidence the plea 
agreement or Graham's criminal record, defendant does not provide the court 
with copies of either item. To this day, no one knows what agreement, if any, 
accompanied Graham's plea bargain. Similarly, defendant does not inform of the 
status of Graham's criminal record, if any. Given this paucity of information, 
defendant's claim that the trial would have ended more favorably had the jury 
known of the plea agreement contents and the criminal history is pure 
speculation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE THE BULLET WAS LEGITIMATELY 
SEIZED UNDER THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE, A 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS WOULD HAVE BEEN 
MERITLESS; THEREFORE, COUNSEL'S REFUSAL TO 
FILE SUCH A MOTION WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE. 
Trial counsel's responsibility to provide effective representation was not 
compromised by his refusal to file a motion to suppress the bullet found in 
defendant's car. When he saw the bullet, Officer Huemiller knew about the 
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drive-by shooting two hours before, the potential involvement of O.V.G. in that 
shooting, and that defendant's trunk contained the license plate cover, described 
in the attempt-to-locate regarding the shooting. These circumstances provided 
sufficient evidence under the "plain view" doctrine to justify the seizure. 
In State v. Keitz, 856 P.2d 685, 691 (Utah App. 1993), this Court set out 
the three-fold test to determine the legality of a seizure under the plain view 
doctrine: (1) lawful presence of the officer; (2) evidence in plain view; and (3) 
evidence "clearly incriminating.'' Here, neither the first nor second tests are in 
dispute. Defendant verbally consented to the search (R. 617). He then gave the 
keys to Officer Huemiller and even opened the door for him to search the car 
fid.). Located on the floor of the front passenger side, the bullet also was 
unquestionably in plain view (R. 418-19; 428). Defendant implicitly concedes 
these facts and, consequently, the first two folds of the three-test. The only 
dispute is the "clearly incriminating'' nature of the bullet. 
In Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983), the federal supreme court 
stated that their decisions "have come to reflect the rule that if, while lawfully 
engaged in an activity in a particular place, police officers perceive a suspicious 
object, they may seize it immediately." Under Brown, an officer may seize an 
item if he has probable cause to believe it is associated with criminal activity. Id. 
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at 741-42. The court noted that the probable cause standard is a flexible and 
common-sense one, requiring only that "the facts available to the officer would 
'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the evidence is 
associated with criminal activity. Id. (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132, 162 (1925). Utah's courts have consistently applied the Brown formula, 
although the phrase "clearly incriminating'' somewhat overstates the level of 
suspicion needed.3 
3
 This term calls to mind language the United States Supreme Court 
used in the plurality opinion in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 
(1971). There, the plurality stated that it must be "immediately apparent" to the 
police that the items seized evidence a crime. Id. The majority in Brown 
specifically rejected this term, calling it an "unhappy choice of words since it can 
be taken to imply that an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminatory 
character of evidence is necessary for an application of the 'plain view' 
doctrine."' Brown, 460 U.S. at 741. The phrase originated in Washington v. 
Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 6 (1982) where the high court stated that the plain view 
"exception ... permits a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is 
incriminating evidence...." 
This language should not be seen as a minimum requirement because the 
evidence seized in that case was marijuana, evidence clearly incriminating per se. 
Unfortunately, the use of the term as shorthand also implies the same "high 
degree of certainty" as "immediately apparent" in Coolidge. According to 
Brown, a "'practical, nontechnical' probability that incriminating evidence is 
involved is all that is required." Id. at 742. In any event, in Utah jurisprudence, 
the phrase "clearly incriminating" is an empty vessel. The courts have always 
defined the phrase in probable cause terminology, as Brown demands. State v. 
Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 210 (Utah 1985) ("[T]he clearly incriminating 
requirement also mandates that officers have probable cause to associate the 
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Looked at from the viewpoint of Officer Huemiller,4 his opinion that the 
bullet evidenced criminal activity was reasonable: (1) a drive-by shooting had 
occurred two hours before that may have involved O.V.G. and defendant was a 
member of O.V.G.; (2) the bullets used in the shooting were 9 millimeter and the 
bullet on the defendant's car floor was 9 millimeter; (3) the attempt-to-locate 
message said that a neon purple license plate cover was on the suspect vehicle 
and there was a neon purple license plate cover in defendant's trunk; (4) the 
people shot at in the drive-by were members of West-Side Pirus; (6) at 
defendant's request, the police were called to Taco Maker because of a possible 
disturbance between O.V.G. and West Side Pirus. 
Because of these circumstances, this case is unlike both State v. Chapman, 
295 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Utah July 19, 1995)5 and Gallegos, 712 P.2d at 210. 
The Chapman court did not even discuss the "plain view" doctrine, concentrating 
property to be seized with criminal activity."). 
4
 As noted in Brown, probable cause determinations always have been 
looked at from the reasonable law enforcement officer's perspective: "[E]vidence 
thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by 
scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement." Id. 
at 742 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)). 
5
 Defendant's brief gives the citation to the unamended version of this 
case. However, the amendment in the new opinion is not relevant to the 
circumstances here. 
10 
instead on the permissible scope of detention. Chapman, 295 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
22-23. 
In Gallegos, the state supreme court decided that evidence seized 
purportedly under the plain view doctrine was unlawfully taken because it was 
not incriminating at all. Gallegos, 712 P.2d at 210. There, police saw a VCR 
and TV while they were lawfully conducting a warrant search for drugs. 
Thinking that these items might be stolen, the officers began an independent 
investigation and seized them after concluding that Gallegos had not "rented" 
them. Id. at 208. The supreme court rejected the State's attempt to justify the 
seizure under the plain view doctrine. At no time, the supreme court stated, did 
the officers have probable cause to believe the TV and VCR were stolen; 
therefore, the "clearly incriminating" part of the test could not be met. Id. 
Defendant's attempt to fit this case into the Gallegos category by saying "[t]here 
is nothing inherently illegal about having a bullet in a car" is misplaced. Officer 
Huemiller's seizure of the bullet was not grounded on the basis that the bullet was 
contraband but because it was evidence of criminal activity, i.e., the drive-by 
shooting that had occurred just shortly before. 
Had trial counsel brought a motion to suppress the bullet, it would have 
been without merit and rejected. The constitution does not require any counsel to 
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bring frivolous or meritless motions. Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 
(Utah 1983). Therefore, bringing a motion to suppress was not a necessary 
component of constitutionally adequate representation and defendant's sixth 
amendment claim must fail on this ground. Because defendant's challenge does 
not satisfy the first prong of the Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 684 (1984) 
test, it is not technically necessary to examine potential prejudice. State v. 
McFadden, 884 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah App. 1994) (trial counsel's failure to 
advise client of potential deportation was not deficient; therefore, unnecessary to 
examine prejudice). Nevertheless, the bullet actually appeared to be a more 
important part of the police investigation, i.e., building the case, than of the trial. 
Including Graham's written statement, four participants of the drive-by shooting 
testified that defendant was the shooter. This evidence alone would have justified 
the conviction. 
H. BECAUSE DEFENDANT HAS NOT PROVIDED 
THIS COURT WITH A COPY OF JEREMIAH 
GRAHAM'S CRIMINAL RECORD OR EVIDENCE 
ABOUT HIS PLEA AGREEMENT, HIS 
ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL WOULD HAVE 
ENDED DIFFERENTLY HAD THEY BEEN 
INTRODUCED IS SPECULATIVE AND DOES 
NOT ESTABLISH INEFFECTIVENESS. 
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Defendant claims his trial counsel should have introduced evidence of 
Jeremiah Graham's criminal record and his plea bargain. Graham, a participant 
in the drive-by shooting, sat in the back of the truck with defendant. Shortly 
after the incident, he temporarily repented of his crime, confessed his 
involvement and named defendant as the gunman in a written statement (R. 233-
36). At trial, however, Graham denied everything: the drive-by shooting, the 
statement, his signature on the statement, any agreement to testify in exchange 
for his statement, and defendant's membership in O.V.G. (R. 224-25). 
Because of this denial, the State's direct examination was short and limited 
in focus. Consequently, trial counsel's cross-examination was also short and 
even more limited. On appeal, defendant asserts that trial counsel failed to 
"properly request Mr. Graham's criminal record" and "interview Mr. Graham to 
determine that he had received a plea bargain in exchange for testimony against 
[defendant]." Brief of Defendant at 15-16. However, defendant never 
documents these assertions, nor does he provide the Court with copies either of 
the plea agreement or the criminal record. Therefore, defendant's appellate 
challenges are nothing more than speculation and cannot lay a foundation for an 
ineffectiveness challenge. Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993) 
("On many occasions, mis court has reiterated that proof of ineffective assistance 
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of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality."). 
For this reason, State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 185 (Utah 1990) does not 
support defendant's position. Templin brought out evidence of his trial counsel's 
negligence in a hearing on a motion for new trial. Id. Defendant never 
requested such a hearing nor has he asked for one under rule 23B, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Because of this failure, he cannot establish what 
investigation trial counsel actually carried out or what the results of a hypothetical 
investigation would have been. 
In any event, Graham's statement was cumulative. Impeaching evidence 
discrediting it would not have substantially detracted from the total evidence 
against defendant. Graham was only one of four co-gang members who testified 
against defendant. Their statements on the stand were substantially the same; 
indeed, Jesse Diarte's, Orlando Naranjo's and Emmett Johnson's testimony were 
more damning (R. 463; R. 337-38; R. 297-302). Due to the overwhelming 
nature of this testimony, the value of defendant's hypothesized impeachment 
would most likely have a negligible effect on the jury's deliberation. Thus, the 
decision not to attempt impeachment may have been a legitimate, strategic one on 
the counsel's part. 
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When a trial counsel is in the midst of trial, he or she prioritize goals and 
objectives. The very words "strategy" and "tactics," used consistently to 
describe counsel's discretionary decisions in ineffectiveness cases, call to mind a 
military analogy which may be helpful to further develop. In a military battle, a 
soldier may find he is being shot at from several different directions 
simultaneously. Obligated to quickly evaluate options, he chooses to concentrate 
his response on what he believes is the most dangerous combatant. Similarly, 
trial counsel here may simply have chosen to devote his time and resources on 
attacking what he believed to be the prosecution's most powerful witnesses. In 
this light, it is interesting to note defendant's apparent concession that trial 
counsel's impeachment and cross-examination of Naranjo and Diarte was proper. 
Brief of Defendant at 14-15. This supports the already present presumption that 
trial counsel's actions were part of a legitimate design. State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 
1201, 1225 (Utah 1983) ("[I]f the challenged act or omission might be considered 
sound trial strategy, we will not find that it demonstrates inadequacy of 
counsel."); State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465-66 (Utah App. 1993) ("[T]his 
court will not second-guess trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices, however 
flawed those choices might appear in retrospect."). 
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The relatively scant value of impeaching Graham's written statement also 
affects the prejudice analysis. Because of the number of the eyewitnesses and the 
strength of their combined testimomes, adding the hypothetical impeachment 
most likely would not change the result of the jury's deliberations. Thus, on 
appeal, defendant's challenge to his trial counsel's decision not to attack 
Graham's credibility survives neither prong of the Strickland test. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's convictions should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS ttflday of September 1996 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JAMES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
Criminal Appeals Division 
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